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ABSTRACT 
Recent years have seen a remarkable expansion in economists’ ability to measure 
corruption. This, in turn, has led to a new generation of well-identified, microeconomic 
studies. We review the evidence on corruption in developing countries in light of these 
recent advances, focusing on three questions: how much corruption is there, what are the 
efficiency consequences of corruption, and what determines the level of corruption. We 
find robust evidence that corruption responds to standard economic incentive theory, but 
also that effects of anti-corruption policies often attenuate as officials find alternate 
strategies to pursue rents.  
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1. Introduction 
The last decade has seen a very significant increase in the international policy community’s 
interest in corruption. From 1998 to present 38 countries have ratified the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention. At the end of 2005 the UN convention against corruption, the most comprehensive 
corruption convention to date, entered into force. In 2007 The World Bank launched its 
Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) 
strategy. In recent years the US Department of Justice and Security and Exchange Commission 
have dramatically increased their enforcements under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Action. 1 
Alongside, several international aid agencies including the Millennium Challenge Corporation 
have made aid disbursements to low-income countries conditional on a country’s corruption 
record.  
These initiatives reflect a growing academic and policy consensus that corruption is often 
high in low-income countries, and is costly. The growing policy activism that conditions 
international assistance on corruption outcome, in turn, reflects a belief that given the right 
incentives politicians, bureaucrats and civil society in these countries can reduce corruption.  
Evaluating these claims requires answers to three questions. The first and, arguably most 
basic, question which underlies policy design is: how prevalent is corruption? Second, what are 
the costs of corruption (i.e.,  is corruption actually harmful)? Finally, what factors influence the 
level of corrupt behavior? For example, is corrupt behavior responsive to economic incentives 
and market forces, and in what ways? Are there other effective approaches that can be brought to 
bear on corruption, such as technology, and how might corrupt officials react to such changes? 
In this paper we review the literature on these three issues, and in each case describe both 
what we know and what we do not.  We include a wide variety of types of corruption in our 
                                                 
1 In 2005 alone, the average number of new DOJ prosecutions exceeded four-fold the average for the prior five 
years. 
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analysis, but primarily focus on bribes to government officials and theft of government resources 
by public officials. 2  
In writing this review, several themes emerged. First, while there has been a revolution in the 
measurement of corruption over the past few years, estimated levels of corruption are remarkably 
heterogeneous, so there remains little consensus about the magnitude of corruption. Second, 
corrupt behavior has significant adverse consequences for efficiency and equity outcomes. Third, 
we find fairly robust evidence that corrupt behavior can be modeled in line with a few general 
economic principles: corrupt officials respond to monitoring and punishments as one would 
expect from basic incentive theory, and standard market forces influence the level of bribes. That 
said, the ability of corrupt officials to substitute to alternate forms of corruption and to otherwise 
adapt to policy changes, either in the short run or the long run, suggests that applications of these 
principles can be tricky in practice. 
In the end we were left with two very different senses. On the one hand, there has been a 
revolution in the measurement of corruption and this has, in turn, led to a blossoming of the 
academic literature on corruption. On the other hand, if we were asked by a politician seeking to 
make his or her country eligible for Millennium Challenge aid or the head of an anti-corruption 
agency what guidance the economic literature could give them about how to tackle the problem, 
we realized that, beyond a few core economic principles, we had more questions to pose than 
concrete answers.  
                                                 
2 While many laws (such as Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) also define cases of 
payment to any third party, in connection with or in furtherance of a contract, as corrupt practices we 
exclude such cases from our analysis. Our definition of corruption also excludes shirking by 
government employees (here, employees steal time from the government, rather than money). A 
number of recent papers estimate absenteeism of health workers and school teachers. We refer 
the interested readers to Chaudury et al (2006) and Banerjee et al (2009) for a comprehensive 
review of that topic.  
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Our review, especially the discussion of how to measure corruption, is related to recent 
survey articles, prominent among which are Zitzewitz (forthcoming) and Banerjee et al (2009). 
We complement these reviews by providing a summary of the different estimates of corruption 
magnitudes and identifying how anti-corruption policies can be enriched by an understanding of 
the role of incentives and market forces in influencing corrupt behavior. 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Section 2 begins by reviewing the evidence 
to date on the magnitudes and efficiency costs of corruption. Section 3 begins by laying out a 
simple theoretical framework for thinking about the determinants of corruption, and then 
examines evidence on the determinants of corruption. Section 4 examines how corruption adapts 
to anti-corruption policies. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Magnitudes and Efficiency Costs 
Anecdotal and survey evidence suggests that corruption is rampant in the developing world 
and more prevalent in developing countries than in rich ones (for a summary of the survey 
evidence on this, see Svensson (2005). Yet, as we show in Section 2.1 there are remarkably few 
reliable estimates of the actual magnitude of corruption and those that exist reveal a high level of 
heterogeneity.  
Just knowing the magnitude of corruption does not tell us how serious the problem is. After 
all, it is at least theoretically possible that corruption represents a transfer from one party (say, 
the government) to another party (say, bureaucrats), with little efficiency cost. In fact, if 
bureaucrats’ official salaries were less than their market wage in expectation of the corrupt rents 
they would obtain—and there is evidence that this is indeed exactly what happens—there could 
be no net costs of corruption at all. In practice, however, the evidence we review in Section 2.2 
suggests that the efficiency costs of corruption can be quite severe, as corruption may raise the 
marginal tax rate of firms, decrease business activity, raise the marginal costs of public funds, 
make certain government projects economically unviable, and undo the government’s ability to 
correct externalities, leading to inefficient outcomes. 
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2.1. Estimating the Magnitude of Corruption 
2.1.1.  Perceptions 
Until very recently, most estimates of corruption were based on surveys of perception. These 
perception surveys have the advantage of good coverage—it is much easier to ask someone’s 
perceptions of corruption than to actually measure corruption directly. As such, they still form 
the basis of most cross-country corruption indices, such as Transparency International’s Annual 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index.3 
Perception-based measures were also used in some of the first empirical work in economics on 
corruption, such as Mauro’s (1995) cross-country study of the relationship between corruption 
and growth.  
The challenge with perception-based measures is that they may not measure corruption 
accurately. To examine the reliability of villagers’ perceptions of the level of corruption in a 
local road building project Olken (2009) obtained villager assessments of the likelihood of 
corruption in the road project. At the same time, he developed a much more detailed measure of 
the amount of corruption that was actually present in the road project by comparing the amount 
the village government spent on the road to the amount independent engineers estimated the road 
would actually cost to build (for details, see Section 2.1.4). While villagers’ perceptions do 
reflect actual corruption in the road project, the correlation is quite weak: increasing the actual 
missing expenditures in the road project by 10 percent increases the probability a villager reports 
any corruption in the road project by just 0.8 percent.  
Moreover, villagers’ perceptions appear to be biased in two ways. First, villagers are much 
better at detecting marked up prices (i.e., overcharging for cement) than inflated quantities (i.e., 
billing for 1000 m3 of rocks but only delivering 800 m3). To the extent that elected leaders care 
about villager perceptions, it is not surprising that most of the corruption occurs by inflating 
quantities. This may account for the relatively low correlation between perceptions and actual 
corruption, since people must make an inference about the aspects of corruption they cannot 
perceive—which end up being where the bulk of corruption is usually hidden. Second, Olken 
                                                 
3 The latter incorporates a variety of different aspects of corruption, ranging from the frequency with which 
firms make  “additional payments to get things done,” to the effects of corruption on the business environment, to 
measuring “grand corruption” in the political arena. 
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shows that individual characteristics, such as one’s education, have much more power in 
predicting perceived corruption than actual corruption itself. If a perception survey has different 
compositions of respondents evaluating different projects (or countries), this could create 
systematic biases in the use of perception. 
One response is to use expert surveys. Banerjee and Pande (2009) estimate political 
corruption among candidates for political office by surveying journalists who covered that 
election and politicians who stood for election in neighboring jurisdictions. They then correlate 
the reported outcomes (such as whether the candidate faced criminal charges) with actual data on 
the same and find a high correlation. The constraint on such surveys, however, remains 
researchers’ ability to identify the correct expert pool, and of course, in other settings it is 
possible that even experts’ perceptions may be biased. 
These types of biases could create problems in macro-level perception indices as well. For 
example, after the fall of Soeharto in 1998, many commentators perceived that corruption in 
Indonesia became worse. The commonly stated view was that any players at both the local and 
the national level started demanding bribes, and their failure to coordinate their bribe-taking 
behavior resulted in a higher total level of bribes. The worsening of perceptions of corruption 
was captured by the Transparency International Index—measured on a scale from 0 (highly 
corrupt) to 10 (highly clean)—which fell from a value of 2.0 in 1998 to 1.7 in 1999, and stayed 
at the same level in 2000.  This may well have been the case, but another explanation is that the 
fall of Soeharto’s dictatorship resulted in a much freer press which was newly able to report on 
allegations of corruption, which it did. It is therefore possible that perceptions of corruption rose 
even though actual corruption fell. For these types of reasons, economists have been moving to 
more direct measures of corruption whenever possible.  
2.1.2.  Survey Estimates of Bribes 
Perhaps the most direct way of measuring bribery is through surveys of bribe-payers. In most 
contexts, there is relatively little stigma associated with paying bribes, and so in many cases 
bribery can be measured using surveys of firms or households. One notable example of this is 
Svensson (2003), who surveyed firms in Uganda and examined how much they paid in bribes. 
On average, firms in the survey report bribe payments of about 88 USD per worker, or about 8 
percent of their total costs. 
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Since this type of survey-based measure of bribes is the most easily replicable, it is one of the 
only areas where consistent measurement is now being carried out across countries and over 
time. One key dataset is the International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS) from 49 countries, in 
which individuals are asked whether any government official in that country has asked them or 
expected them to pay a bribe for his services during the previous year. Using this data, Mocan 
(2008), for example, finds that income and education of the individual have positive impacts on 
the likelihood of being asked for a bribe in developing, but not developed, countries. For firms, 
the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES)4 have asked comparable questions about firms’ 
informal gifts or payments in obtaining water, electricity, telephone connection, operating and 
import licenses, or obtaining construction-related contracts, meeting with tax officials, securing 
government contracts, and more generally “getting things done” for many low- and middle-
income economies. As this type of data becomes more available we will be able to produce more 
reliable estimates of bribery over time and across countries. 
2.1.3.  Estimates from Direct Observation 
The best way to measure corruption is often to observe it directly. Needless to say, this is 
difficult, since officials rarely will let corrupt behavior be observed. Nevertheless, there are 
several notable examples of direct observation of corrupt activity. One such example is the case 
of Montesinos in Peru, documented by McMillan and Zoido (2004). Montesinos, who was 
secret-police chief under President Alberto Fujimori in Peru, bribed judges, politicians and the 
news media to support the Fujimori regime. Remarkably, he kept detailed records, with signed 
contracts from those he bribed and videotapes of them accepting the bribes and these became 
public after the fall of the Fujimori regime. McMillan and Zoido use them to estimate the cost of 
bribing various types of government officials. On average, politicians received bribes ranging 
from 3,000 - 50,000 USD per month, depending on whether the politician was in the opposition 
party (higher) or Fujimori’s party (lower), with judges receiving bribes of the same order of 
magnitude. The bribes to control the media were orders of magnitude larger—as much as USD 
1.5 million per month for one television station’s support.  
                                                 
4 See https://www.enterprisesurveys.org for exact details on the number of countries and years available for 
each type of survey.  
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Olken and Barron (2009) provide direct data on actual bribes in a more prosaic setting: the 
bribes truck drivers pay to police on their routes to and from the Indonesian province of Aceh. 
Over a nine month period, enumerators accompanied truck drivers on their regular routes, 
dressed as truck drivers’ assistants, and simply noted the amounts that truck drivers paid each 
time they were stopped at a police checkpoint or weigh station. On over 300 trips, they observed 
more than 6,000 illegal payments. Usually each payment was small—averaging USD0.50 to 
USD1, sometimes in cash and sometimes in kind (such as a pack or two of cigarettes). In total, 
the illegal payments represented 13 percent of the marginal cost of the trip. By comparison, the 
salary of the truck driver was only 10 percent of the marginal cost of the trip.5  
Sequeira and Djankov (2010) use a similar methodology in Mozambique and South Africa, 
shadowing clearing agents who process customs for cargo as it passes through the ports. 
Specifically, they estimate the economic costs and distortions associated to corruption acts at two 
ports in Mozambique and South Africa by directly observing bribe payments to port and border 
post officials for a random sample of 1,300 shipments. They find that, on average, bribes 
represent 14 percent of the shipping costs for a standard container passing through the port of 
Maputo, Mozambique, and 4 percent of  shipping costs for a standard container passing through 
Durban, South Africa.  
2.1.4. Graft Estimation by Subtraction 
The most common method for estimating graft (ie., the theft of government funds) is what 
we term estimation by subtraction. In this method, one obtains two measures of the same 
quantity, one measure before corruption takes place and one measure after corruption takes 
place. The estimate of corruption is the difference between the two measures.  
One of the first estimates using this technique is the pioneering study by Reinikka and 
Svennson (2004).  Using what they term a Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS), they 
compare the amount of a special education block grant sent down from the central government in 
Uganda with the amount of the block grant received by schools. They estimate a leakage rate of 
                                                 
5 The authors also compared directly observed bribes to reported bribes from a survey of comparable trips, and 
found that reported bribes were about double actually observed bribes. One potential explanation is that drivers have 
an incentive to over report bribes in general, since they are reimbursed by trucking firms on the basis of the average 
amount of bribes they need to pay. 
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87 percent. Once the results were publicized, a subsequent study found that the leakage rate fell 
to less than 20 percent. An important question in such an approach is the quality of 
recordkeeping: if schools have poor records, some of the money might not show up on the books 
even though it may have been received. Studying the importance of recordkeeping quality in 
PETS is an important issue for the replicability of this technique. Subsequent to this work, 
similar PETS studies have been carried out, largely by the World Bank, in a variety of contexts; 
for a brief review see Olken and Pande (2011).  
Using a similar approach, Fisman and Wei (2004) measured tax evasion by comparing Hong 
Kong’s reported exports and China’s reported imports of the same products. They differentiate 
three different aspects of tax evasion: underreporting of unit value, underreporting of taxable 
quantities, and mislabeling of higher-taxed products as lower-taxed products. These calculations 
are then used to estimate the effect of tax rates in tax evasion. They found that higher-taxed 
products were associated with a forty percent higher median evasion rate. 
Olken (2007) implements a related exercise in the case of rural road projects. He compares 
the official amount spent on the road to an independent engineering estimate of what the road 
actually cost to build, where engineers dug core samples of the roads to estimate materials 
quantities, did price surveys to estimate local prices, and interviewed villagers to estimate actual 
wages paid. Importantly, since some amount of materials naturally disappears during 
construction, Olken built several small “test roads” where he knew there was no corruption so 
that he could calibrate the metric so it would show zero corruption when, in fact, corruption was 
zero. Olken estimated that “missing expenditures”—the difference between what the village 
claimed the road cost and what the engineers estimated it actually cost—averaged about 24 
percent of the total cost of the road.  
An alternative approach is to compare administrative data to a generally administered 
household survey. Olken (2006) uses this approach to estimate theft of rice from a program that 
distributed subsidized rice in Indonesia. He estimates that, on average, at least 18 percent of the 
rice cannot be accounted for, with greater amounts in ethnically heterogeneous and sparsely 
populated areas. In a similar vein, Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2010) compare administrative and 
survey data to measure corruption as the gap between official and actual quantities—including 
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over-reporting of days and under-payment of wages in the Indian National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act. 
 When examining corruption through price manipulations, one can compare an official 
price to the market price and use the difference as a measure of price manipulation. Hsieh and 
Moretti (2006) do this for a very famous case: corruption under the Iraqi Oil-For-Food program 
administered by the United Nations. Specifically, they compare the price received by Iraq for its 
oil to the going price for comparable oil on the world spot market and use a model of the market 
for oil trading to infer what share of that under-pricing was likely received by Saddam Hussein’s 
regime. While the total amount of corruption they estimate is enormous—approximately USD 
1.3 billion—it amounts to only about 2 percent of the total volume of oil sold. Of course, not all 
price markups are corruption—they could simply reflect incompetence or a lack of incentives in 
obtaining good prices for the government (see, for instance, Bandiera et al (2009)).  
2.1.5.  Estimates from Market Inference 
In some cases one can use the theory of market equilibrium, combined with data on market 
activity, to estimate the amount of corruption. In a pioneering study, Fisman (2001) applied this 
approach to estimate the value of political connections to Indonesian president Soeharto. 
Specifically, he obtained an estimate from a Jakarta consulting firm of how much each publicly 
traded firm was “connected” to Soeharto, on a scale of 0-4. He then estimated how much each 
firm’s price moved when Soeharto fell ill to estimate the stock market assessment of the value of 
those political connections. If the efficient markets hypothesis holds, then the change in stock 
market value surrounding these events captures the value of the political connection to the firm. 
Since investment bankers in Jakarta estimated that the total market would fall by 20 percent if 
Soeharto died, he can calibrate these estimates to estimate the total “value” of the connections to 
Soeharto. On net, for the most connected firms he estimates that about 23 percent of their value 
was due to Soeharto’s connections. 
The Fisman market approach is replicable in any case where one has data on firms’ 
connections to prominent politicians and when the politician experiences health shocks. For 
example, Fisman et al (2006) has replicated the same approach for the United States, looking at 
the value of connections to former U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, using shocks while he was 
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a candidate and while he was in office. In a marked contrast with the Soeharto paper, he finds 
zero effect of Cheney’s heart attacks on the value of Cheney-connected stocks.  
Faccio (2006) pursues a similar approach using a large sample of countries—she examines 
political connections to 20,202 publicly traded firms in 47 countries. For each of these firms, she 
defines the firm as having a political connection if a board member or large shareholder is a 
politician (e.g., Member of Parliament or minister). She focuses on corporations where a 
previous board member and large shareholder becomes a politician. She finds that, on average, 
having a member of your board or large shareholder become a politician is associated with a 2.29 
percent increase in the company’s share value. Echoing the contrast between Soeharto in 
Indonesia and Cheney in the United States, when she splits the sample into countries with below 
and above average corruption levels (as measured by the World Bank perceptions index), she 
finds that the impact comes entirely from high corruption countries: in above median corruption 
countries, having a board member or large shareholder become a politician increases stock 
market value by 4.32 percent, but in below median corruption countries, having a board member 
or large shareholder become a politician has no impact on stock value.  
Another approach to measuring corruption uses equilibrium conditions in the labor market. 
Specifically, one can use the fact that people in the public sector must, on the margin, be 
indifferent between their public sector job and alternative jobs in the private sector. If, 
controlling for their job opportunities, pay is lower in the public sector, the result could simply 
reflect a compensating wage differential. But if pay in the public sector is lower but consumption 
levels are the same, one could infer that the difference between pay and consumption in the 
public sector relative to the same difference in the private sector tells us something about how 
much those in the public sector are likely receiving in the form of bribes. Gorodnichenko and 
Peter (2007) perform this exercise using a household survey in Ukraine. They find that, 
controlling for education, hours of work, job security, fringe benefits, job satisfaction, and 
secondary employment, public sector workers received 24-32 percent less income than their 
private sector counterparts. Crucially, however, they have the same level of consumption and 
assets, suggesting that a large part of the gap must be made up in bribes. Aggregating across the 
economy they estimate that the total amount of the gap (and hence bribery) is between USD 460 
million – USD 580 million, or about 1 percent of GDP. 
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2.1.6. Other approaches 
While we have discussed the main approaches used in the literature, this is not an 
exhaustive list. For instance, Ferraz and Finan (2008, 2010a) and Brollo et al (2010) use official 
audits of municipal governments in Brazil to identify instances of corruption. These audits were 
directly summarized and made available to the media. The summary provided a short description 
of each of the irregularities in the municipality. The challenge with audit data is that it represents 
a combination of both actual corruption and the inability to hide it from auditors, so this data 
needs to be used with care. 
Asking whether, conditional on observables (which measure eligibility for public 
programs) public officials are more likely to benefit from publicly provided private transfers 
provides another measure of corruption. Besley et al (2011) show that controlling for asset-based 
eligibility, holding political office increases the likelihood that a villager in India has a Below the 
Poverty Line Card by 10%. A similar approach (and findings) are reported in Olken (2007) and 
Atanassova et al (2011). 
2.1.7. So How Much Corruption Is There, Really? 
Table 1 presents the magnitude of corruption estimated from all of the studies reviewed 
above, separated into estimates of graft (theft of government funds) and estimates of bribes.6 The 
table shows the dramatic range. It also shows that, while a number of credible estimates have 
emerged, in some sense there is relatively little hard data when compared with other 
development indicators.  
The magnitudes of corruption raise several important questions. First, a striking correlation 
that comes up in a variety of datasets—from the perception indices to the Faccio (2006) and 
Fisman (2001) studies of the value of political connections to the Sequeira and Djankov (2010) 
comparison between ports in South Africa and Mozambique—is the strong negative relationship 
between income and corruption: as best we can measure it, richer countries appear less corrupt. 
The causality potentially runs in both directions. It is easy to see how low corruption could cause 
countries to become rich if corruption hinders economic activity (Mauro 1995). However, the 
                                                 
6 We include estimates of the value of political connections in the graft category, under the idea that the value of 
those connections comes from the firm’s ability to appropriate rents from the government due their connections, 
although one could easily categorize them separately instead. 
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relationship in the other direction—that richer countries become less corrupt—is less obvious. 
On the one hand, certain types of income shocks, such as natural resource shocks, may lead to 
there being more rents to be expropriated and more corruption. For example, Caselli and 
Michaels (2009) present the case of oil revenues distributed to municipalities in Brazil, as a 
result of the large increase in Brazil’s off-shore oil production in Brazil, and argue that this led to 
an increase in corruption.7  There is, however, some evidence that these rents dissipate in the 
medium-run possibly because voters become more aware about total resources (Monteiro and 
Ferraz 2010). On the other hand, more complex business relationships may lead to demand for 
better government, and higher incomes may mean that countries have more resources to invest in 
cleaning up corruption (Triesman (2000)).  
Second, even among countries at similar income levels, and even within countries, there is 
marked heterogeneity in corruption levels, as shown in Table 1. Once one starts examining why 
corruption emerges it becomes clear that there is no reason to expect magnitudes of corruption to 
be similar across settings.  
Third, virtually all of these “hard” estimates of corruption may suffer from selection bias in 
both directions. To the extent that measures of corruption depend on voluntary disclosure, such 
as surveys of bribery or disclosing links to politicians sitting on corporate boards, corruption may 
be understated, as places where corruption is most severe might be less likely to disclose it. To 
the extent that researchers purposively choose cases to study, corruption may be overstated, as 
researchers may hone in on situations where they expect to find corruption. Developing careful, 
rigorous metrics of corruption that are not subject to these types of selection bias is an important 
area for future research. 
2.2. Does Corruption Matter? 
Although the previous section has shown that corruption is substantial in magnitude—
whether in the form of bribes given to civil servants or graft from public expenditures—this does 
                                                 
8 Although the level of this effect seems enormous, it is worth recalling that the bribe and tax rates are 
expressed as fractions of sales, not profits. Since profits are much smaller than sales, the implied bribe and tax rates 
on profits are much higher than those on sales, so the estimated impact of a 1 percentage point increase in a tax on 
profits would be substantially smaller than what they estimate.  
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not necessarily answer the question of whether corruption actually has a negative impact on 
economic activity.  
For example, Gorodnichenko and Peter (2007) showed that, on average, public employees in 
Ukraine have the same consumption levels as their private sector counterparts, even though their 
salaries are 24-32 percent lower. Corruption does not seem to be providing extra income to these 
public employees, as what the government pays them is reduced exactly to offset the amount 
they receive in bribes. In this case the economic efficiency losses (or gains) from corruption 
depend on whether the deadweight loss imposed by the bribes they collect is greater than (or 
smaller than) the equivalent deadweight loss from taxation that would be needed to raise the 
revenue to pay the equivalent amount of money in salaries were corruption was eliminated. More 
generally, corruption could have either efficiency costs or lead to efficiency gains. 
This section lays out the evidence thus far on the ways in which corruption may have 
aggregate efficiency costs: the costs imposed on firms, the costs imposed on government 
activity, and the costs imposed through the government’s lack of ability to correct externalities. 
The endogenous nature of corruption makes finding credible instruments for corruption at the 
macro level difficult. We therefore restrict attention to micro evidence.   
2.2.1.  Impact on Firms 
To estimate the efficiency cost of corruption on firm behavior, ideally one must know several 
things. First, how does corruption change the effective marginal tax rate faced by firms? To the 
extent that bribery is used to reduce tax liabilities (e.g., bribing tax officials to reduce tax 
payments), the marginal bribe rate should be below the official marginal tax rate, so corruption 
reduces effective tax rates. On the other hand, if bribes are charged for other types of government 
activities, this could increase the effective marginal tax rate faced by firms. Second, conditional 
on knowing the effective marginal tax rate after corruption, for a given effective marginal tax 
rate are taxes affected by corruption are more distortionary than de jure taxes?  
Svensson’s (2003) study of bribe-paying behavior in Uganda provides some clues that while 
there is a positive relationship between bribes and firm profits, it is very flat. Specifically, he 
estimates that that each USD 1.00 in firm profits per employee leads to about USD 0.004 in 
additional bribes paid, for a “marginal bribe rate” of 0.4 percent on profits. He also finds that 
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each USD 1.00 in capital stock per employee leads to an additional USD 0.004 in additional 
bribes paid, representing an additional 0.4 percent “marginal bribe rate” on capital stock. Note 
that these are marginal rates: the average level of bribes is substantially higher, but bribes 
increase relatively weakly with profits and capital stock. If the only impact of corruption was to 
impose a tax of 0.4 percent on profits and 0.4 percent on capital, one might expect that  a modest 
impact of corruption on firm activity. By way of comparison, the marginal tax rate on corporate 
profits for large corporations in the United States is 35 percent.  
The Svensson study establishes  effective corruption tax rates but does not tell us the impact 
of corruption on firms. There may be other ways in which corruption affects firm behavior 
beyond the marginal tax rate. For example, many have argued that the uncertainty surrounding 
corruption makes it more costly than an equivalently-sized tax. Wei (2000) makes this argument 
looking at foreign direct investment and measuring uncertainty through perceptions-based 
metrics. More recently, Malesky and Samphantharak (2008) use survey data to show that  
changes in governors in Cambodia are associated with increases in uncertainty about corruption, 
but reductions in actual corruption levels and decreased firm-level investment.  
In section 2.1.3 we described Sequeira and Djankov (2010) who examined a different type of 
distortion: changes in the firm’s production choices designed to avoid corruption. Their estimates 
suggest that about 46 percent of South African firms located in regions in which overland costs 
to the port of Maputo are 57 percent lower go the long way around to Durban to avoid higher 
bribe payments. This represents a real efficiency loss: firms are willing to pay higher (real) 
trucking costs to avoid having to pay bribes in Mozambique. 
Given that corruption could have both direct effects (through changing the effective marginal 
tax rate) as well as indirect effects (through uncertainty or other channels), it is necessary to 
directly examine the net impact of corruption on firm decisions. Fisman and Svensson (2007), 
using the same dataset as in Svensson (2003), calculate bribes and tax payments in Uganda as a 
function of total firm sales. They regress firm growth over a two-year period on the bribe and tax 
rate, instrumenting for the bribe and tax rate with industry-by-location averages. A 1 percentage 
point increase in bribes reduces annual firm growth by three percentage points. By comparison, a 
1 percentage point increase in taxes reduces annual firm growth by 1 percentage point, so bribes 
have three times the negative impact of taxes on firm performance. They interpret the findings as 
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showing that the negative impacts of bribes on firm activity are higher than the corresponding 
impacts of taxation—with substantially large magnitudes for both.8  
2.2.2.  Impact on Government Provision of Goods and Services 
Corruption can have efficiency consequences through impacts on government provisions of 
goods and services. First, if it increases the cost of government goods and services, this could 
have an effect similar to raising the price of these goods and services. The efficiency loss would 
arise if projects that would be cost effective at the true costs are no longer cost effective once the 
costs of corruption are included, and hence are not done. Second, corruption could create 
additional efficiency costs through distortions. Corrupt officials usually cannot steal cash 
directly, as that would be easily detected; instead, they need to go through a variety of more 
convoluted procedures to extract rents. These convoluted procedures themselves may induce 
inefficiencies, which could potentially be larger than the direct cost of corruption itself. We 
explore both of these issues in turn. 
(i) Price Effects 
One way corruption may matter is if theft of government resources increases the cost of 
government activity, so that otherwise worthwhile government projects—such as redistribution 
schemes or public works projects—become non-cost effective. Olken (2006) examines this 
possibility in the context of a large Indonesian anti-poverty program that distributed subsidized 
rice to poor households. As described above, by comparing survey data to administrative data, 
Olken estimates that at least 18 percent of the rice was lost from the program. He also performs a 
welfare calculation of the benefits of the program, both as it was implemented and using a 
counterfactual with the same targeting of beneficiaries but without corruption. The estimates 
imply that the welfare losses from this “missing rice” may have been large enough to offset the 
potential welfare gains from the redistributive intent of the program, so that the program without 
corruption might have been cost effective but, in the presence of corruption, it likely was not.  
                                                 
8 Although the level of this effect seems enormous, it is worth recalling that the bribe and tax rates are 
expressed as fractions of sales, not profits. Since profits are much smaller than sales, the implied bribe and tax rates 
on profits are much higher than those on sales, so the estimated impact of a 1 percentage point increase in a tax on 
profits would be substantially smaller than what they estimate.  
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In this particular case, the government implemented the program anyway, so in a sense the 
efficiency costs from lost redistribution were not realized. An open question, however, is 
whether governments endogenously adjust their composition of expenditures in response to the 
higher prices imposed by corruption. We regard this question—of whether governments indeed 
optimize taking the price effects of corruption into account—as important for future research. 
(ii) Distortions 
Since corrupt officials need to hide their activity, they may introduce two types of distortions 
into the procurement of government activity. First, since corruption is secret, the government 
may not anticipate the amounts lost to corruption (in some ways, this is the countervailing force 
to the price effects discussed above). It may then effectively underfund some activities relative to 
its preferences, once the losses due to corruption are taken into account. Second, the need to keep 
corrupt activity secret could also introduce distortions, as procurement officials may substitute 
the types of goods that make hiding corruption easier. We discuss the evidence for both of these 
types of corruption in turn. 
The first type of efficiency impact is the effective under-provision of government activities, 
since the government does not fully anticipate the impact of the losses due to corruption. As 
described above, Olken (2007) and Olken (2009) provide evidence for this type of efficiency loss 
in studies of perceptions vs. reality for rural roads in Indonesia. Since villagers are better able to 
detect corruption where prices are marked up (where there would only be a price effect), village 
officials instead hide their corruption by deflating quantities, i.e., they claim to procure enough 
rock, sand, and gravel to make a road that is 20cm thick but instead build a road that is only 
15cm thick. Since the roads they build are thinner than official engineering guidelines, they will 
not last nearly as long, and will need to be replaced sooner. Although Olken was not able to 
directly detect this quicker rate of decay in the timeframe of his study, engineers estimate that the 
impact of the thinner-than-design roads on road lifespan is substantial enough to cause 
significant efficiency losses. 
Ferraz, Finan, and Moreira (2010) provide direct evidence of the efficiency costs. They show 
that students in Brazilian municipalities where corruption was detected in education have test 
scores that are 0.35 standard deviations lower than those without corruption, as well as higher 
dropout and failure rates. Moreover, higher corruption translates into lower quantities received: 
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teachers in corrupt municipalities are 10.7 percentage points less likely to receive pedagogical 
training and less likely to have a computer or science lab. The study does not discuss the 
composition of school budgets, so it is hard to know if what the authors are picking up is price 
effects (there is less spending on schools because the government anticipates corruption) or 
distortions from corruption. One challenge in the study is that the level of corruption may be 
endogenous: while the authors control for other municipal characteristics, as well as corruption 
in other sectors and some indicators for school management practices, the level of corruption 
could be correlated with unobservable variables related to the quality of the school.  
Another direct estimate of the efficiency costs due to distortion is the allocation of capital 
from state banks. Khwaja and Mian (2005) show that politically connected firms, defined as 
those with a politician on their boards, receive 45 percent larger loans from government banks in 
spite of having a 50 percent higher default rates on these loans. Privately owned banks, on the 
other hand, show no such political bias. According to estimates, and assuming the default rates 
are equivalent to transfers from taxpayers, the deadweight loss due to corrupt lending is between 
0.15 percent and 0.30 percent of GDP. When the effect of inefficient investment of politically 
connected firms is considered, an additional 1.6 percent of GDP is estimated to be lost each year 
due to preferential lending.  
2.2.3.  Impact on Correcting Externalities 
A third way in which corruption may lead to inefficiency is if it lessens the government’s 
ability to correct an externality. For example, if someone can bribe a police officer or judge 
instead of paying an official fine, the marginal cost of breaking the law is reduced from the 
official fine to the amount of the bribe. Even worse, if the police officer extracts the same bribe 
regardless of whether the person has broken the law, the marginal cost of breaking the law falls 
to zero and the law ceases to have a disincentive effect altogether.  
Olken and Barron (2009) examined this possibility in the context of trucks stopping at weigh 
stations in Aceh, Indonesia. Overweight trucks are a classic example of an externality: the 
benefits to a trucker from loading on additional weight are concave, whereas the damage the 
truck does to the road rises to the 4th power with the truck’s weight. They found that almost all 
trucks were substantially over the weight limits—and 42 percent of trucks were more than 50 
percent over the legal weight limit. The data suggest that corruption at weight stations is the 
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likely culprit. Whereas according to the law all trucks more than 5 percent over the legal weight 
limit are supposed to be ticketed, immediately unload their excess cargo, and appear in court to 
face a fine, in fact virtually none received an official ticket. Instead, almost all paid a bribe. 
While more overweight trucks did pay higher bribes, this relationship was very flat, and even 
those trucks that were not overweight had to pay a bribe. Corruption thus dramatically reduced 
the marginal cost of driving overweight, leading to more overweight trucks. 
Bertrand et al (2007) examined a similar question in the context of drivers’ licenses in India. 
They randomly allocated applicants for driving licenses into three groups. The first group 
received a bonus if they obtained a driver’s license quickly, the second group received free 
driving lessons and the third group served as the comparison group. The findings confirm an 
efficiency loss: many people who were completely unable to drive were able to obtain licenses 
by paying a fee to an agent–and, in fact, the fee charged by the agent was unrelated to one’s 
ability to drive. This efficiency loss effect was greater among the group that received the bonus 
for quickly obtaining a driving license since they faced a higher incentive to bypass the official 
procedures. On the other hand, those who were randomly allocated to the driver’s license 
training class and who were better drivers were able to obtain their license with lower payments 
on average, mostly because they avoided using agents and instead used the official channel.  
The Bertrand et al (2007) and the Olken and Barron (2009) studies have very similar 
findings: in both cases, those who are doing the activity the government wishes to discourage 
(getting a license if you can’t drive or having a truck that is overweight) do pay a higher cost that 
those who obey the laws. However, the marginal cost of breaking the law is much lower with 
corruption than it would be without corruption, so the net impact of corruption is to decrease the 
marginal cost of breaking the law and, thus, to decrease the effectiveness of the law. 
These studies raise an important question: given that corruption exists, how should the 
government structure the official laws so that the net of corruption marginal cost faced by 
citizens matches the government’s true objective function? Understanding how corruption maps 
de jure marginal costs imposed by laws into de facto marginal bribe payments (and hence the de 
facto marginal costs faced by individuals) is an important next step in thinking about how to 
more effectively write laws in the presence of corruption. 
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2.2.4.  Impact on Individuals 
A final question is how corruption affects individuals directly. Hunt (2007) shows the 
negative distributional impact of corruption not by arguing that poor people expend a higher 
proportion of their income on bribes, but by stating that corruption can be an additional cost on 
the victims of misfortune—particularly crime victims. The study relies on an individual survey in 
Peru to show that misfortune increases victims' demand for public services, raising bribery 
indirectly. However, the study also shows that in many situations crime victims bribe more than 
other users who are not victims.  
2.2.5.  Some Concluding Thoughts on Efficiency 
One common theme that has emerged is that we know little about how governments respond 
endogenously to the presence of corruption. For example, if there are higher or lower rates of 
corruption in certain types of government spending, does it re-optimize spending as theory would 
predict, and does this re-optimization mitigate the efficiency costs of corruption? Or given that 
government rules to correct externalities are partially (but not completely) undone by corruption, 
does the government set official fines higher than they really want, knowing the official fines 
will not be implemented exactly?  
An issue on the flip side of this is the degree to which governments create regulations to 
maximize opportunities for corruption. A classic example of this is red tape. We refer the 
interested reader to Banerjee et al (2011) who develop a theoretical framework for understanding 
how red tape itself may be endogenously created as a way to maximize the corrupt rents captured 
by bureaucrats, as suggested by Banerjee (1997) and review the existing empirical literature. It is 
clear that understanding whether the red tape itself is an endogenous response is another form of 
inefficiency that merits further study. 
Similar issues apply to the costs of corruption for firms. While the Fisman and Svensson 
(2007) study suggested that bribes were more costly for firms than equivalent amounts of taxes, 
the tax rate could also be endogenous to the level of corruption. Gordon and Li (2009), for 
example, suggest that the tax code of developing countries is endogenously shaped by the 
presence of tax evasion, as governments reallocate tax systems towards those areas that are less 
prone to corruption. However, whether marginal tax rates on firms are higher or lower in corrupt 
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countries and therefore whether the net distortions taxes imply for firms is higher or lower in 
corrupt countries, is an open question for future research. 
3. What Determines Corruption 
This section examines what we know about why corruption exists, and related to this, what 
can be done with it.  
To organize ideas, we provide a simple framework that models the perspective of an 
individual bureaucrat, following the ideas of Becker and Stigler (1974). This framework treats 
the gains from corruption (the bribe) as fixed and asks when honesty will be preferable to 
honesty. We then examine what happens when the optimal bribe is determined by the bureaucrat 
taking into account market forces, following the ideas of Shleifer and Vishny (1993). The 
subsequent sections discuss the empirical evidence along the dimensions suggested by the simple 
theoretical framework. 
3.1. The Incentives Bureaucrats Face 
Suppose that the bureaucrat receives a wage w from the government and, if fired, can receive 
an outside option v. The bureaucrat can decide to be corrupt or honest. If corrupt, he is detected 
with probability p, is fired, and receives outside option v. If he is undetected, he receives his 
wage w plus the bribe b, less a dishonesty cost d.  In equilibrium, he will be corrupt if and only if 
.  
This framework suggests several avenues for reducing corruption. One could increase the 
returns to staying on the job (w), or, equivalently in this context, one could decrease the outside 
option (v) by increasing punishments. One could also increase the probability of detection (p). 
One implication is that if there is heterogeneity in d among potential bureaucrats, there can 
be selection where those who are most likely to be corrupt (those who have the lowest dishonesty 
costs d) will self-select to be more likely to become bureaucrats. Suppose that d in the population 
is distributed uniformly from 0 to . If  , then nobody will be corrupt, regardless of 
their level d, and there is no reason that the distribution of d among bureaucrats will be different 
than the distribution of d in the population.  
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If, however, the above inequality does not hold, then people with low d will have a higher 
utility from becoming bureaucrats than those with high d, since they will be relatively more 
efficient at corruption, so depending on how the government allocates jobs we might expect to 
have more low d people among bureaucrats than in the population. This implies that corruption 
may be harder to combat since a corrupt system may attract bureaucrats who are more prone to 
corruption. It also implies that the effect of a given anti-corruption policy (i.e., a vector (w,p)) 
will depend on past levels of anti-corruption policies, since those past policies will influence the 
selection of bureaucrats.  
The simple framework thus far has treated the amount of the bribe, b as exogenous. In 
practice, however, the bribe may be set by the bureaucrat to maximize his profits. Specifically, 
conditional on deciding to be corrupt, the bureaucrat will set his bribes to maximize his profits, 
which are the number of bribes he receives multiplied by the price, i.e. .9 The key insight of 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) is that the optimal solution depends on what other bureaucrats are 
doing and how they set prices. If a person needs permits from two different bureaucrats to 
complete a transaction, and both set prices independently, then each bureaucrat solves 
, taking the other bureaucrat’s bribe  as given. In such a case, the total 
amount of the bribes ( ) will be higher than if there had only been a single bureaucrat, and 
the total quantity will be lower. Conversely, if a consumer needs a single permit which can be 
obtained from either bureaucrat, they will compete against each other and reduce the bribe 
beyond what a single, monopolistic bureaucrat would charge. The key insight is that the bribes 
themselves may be a function of the structure of the bureaucracy, and that changing the nature of 
the organization may have important implications for the level of corruption. 
This framework, while stylized, highlights the important role that both the incentive structure 
faced by individual bureaucrats (be it compensation, monitoring, selection, or other incentives) 
as well as the bureaucratic organization may play in influencing the amount of corrupt behavior. 
This section discusses the evidence to date on each of these factors in turn.  
                                                 
9 To simplify the analysis, we will assume that conditional on being caught, the probability of being caught does 
not depend on the amount of the bribes or the quantity of bribes, though one could easily generalize the model to 
include these effects. 
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3.1.1.  The Bureaucrat’s Decision Problem: the Role of Compensation, Selection, and Other 
Incentives  
(i) Compensation 
Despite the attention often given to civil service wages, there is relatively little evidence on 
their impact. Several cross-country studies find that higher public wages are associated with 
lower corruption, though these studies are essentially cross-sectional in nature. For instance, in a 
cross-section of 31 low-income countries, Van Rijkenghem and Weder (2001) find that a 
doubling of government relative to manufacturing wages is associated with only 0.5 point 
reduction in ICRG corruption index measured on a scale from 0 to 6. Meanwhile, Rauch and 
Evans (2000) find that the level of bureaucratic wages are significant in explaining only one of  
the five measures of bureaucratic performance, namely that a 1 standard deviation increase in 
salary is associated with an improvement of 0.5 standard deviation in the bureaucratic delay 
index measured on a range from 1 to 4.   
With regard to more micro evidence, Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) test the efficiency 
wage idea by looking at a corruption crackdown in Buenos Aires hospitals’ procurement 
departments. They examine the impact of increasing the probability of detection and examine 
heterogeneous impacts on the prices paid for basic inputs based on the level of wages. Prices 
paid by hospitals for basic, homogeneous inputs decrease by 15 percent during the first 9 months 
of the crackdown, and following period prices increase, but remain 10 percent lower than those 
prevailing before the crackdown. During the first phase of the crack-down, when audit intensity 
can be expected to be maximal, higher wages have no effect on inducing lower input prices. 
Meanwhile, higher wages do have a negative effect in the last phase of the crackdown, when 
audit intensity can be expected to take intermediate values -the wage elasticity of input prices 
exceeds 0.2.  
Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2010) examine the idea that the rents from keeping one’s job can 
deter corruption today in order to preserve tomorrow’s opportunities. The rents they examine 
come from corruption, not wages. They can identify the effect of future rents on the level of 
corruption today because the program features two types of projects; some projects pay fixed 
daily wages, while others pay piece rates. They examine how corruption in the two types of 
projects varies with anticipated rent-extraction opportunities using an exogenous increase in the 
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wage rate for daily wage projects. Their results show an 80 percent reduction in the daily theft on 
piece rate projects in the period post-wage increase. Hence, when the opportunities for theft from 
daily wage projects increase, theft on piece rate projects goes down. In addition, they find 
reduced over-reporting of days worked on daily wage projects in areas where the proportion of 
future daily wage projects is higher. 
(ii) Monitoring and Punishments 
One would expect from the  above framework that increasing monitoring  would reduce 
corruption. In practice, however, the very individuals tasked with monitoring and enforcing 
punishments may themselves be corruptible, so increasing monitoring may simply increase 
transfers from low-level officials to auditors. Moreover, just because people are audited does not 
necessarily mean that auditors will find enough evidence to actually impose a punishment, even 
if corruption was taking place. Understanding the degree to which additional monitoring can 
reduce corrupt behavior is thus an important area for empirical research. 
Olken (2007), in the study of roads in Indonesia, examines this question by conducting a 
randomized experiment on auditing.  Before villages began building road projects, some villages 
were randomly selected for a high audit intensity group, where they faced an audit by the 
government agency with 100 percent probability, as opposed to a 4 percent probability in the 
control group. Olken found substantial effects of the government audits, reducing corruption by 
8 percentage points or about 30 percent from the baseline level. Interestingly, the audits revealed 
substitution among alternative forms of corruption: although audits reduced missing 
expenditures, they increased nepotism (i.e., the hiring of family members of the project leader or 
village officials to work on the project). One reason that the audits did not reduce corruption to 
zero was that, even though audits found problems in 90 percent of the villages they audited, the 
findings were typically administrative failures, such as improper receipts or a failure to receive 
the required number of competitive bids, rather than the direct evidence of corruption that would 
be needed for a criminal prosecution. Put another way, just because the probability of an audit 
was 100 percent does not imply that the probability of punishment, conditional on the presence 
of corruption, was 100 percent. Nevertheless, on balance, the results demonstrate that the 
traditional economic approach to fighting crime—increasing the expected cost of crime by 
increasing the probability of being caught—can play an important role in reducing corruption, 
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even in a highly corrupt environment where those doing the monitoring are themselves 
potentially corruptible.  
Another approach to providing monitoring—that does not involve a central auditor—is 
grassroots monitoring, where regular citizens are empowered to monitor their officials to prevent 
corruption. Olken’s study also examined this by randomly allocating villages to receive more 
intensive community monitoring. This was done through two interventions, with different 
purposes. The first intervention involved inviting hundreds of villagers to attend local 
accountability meetings, to reduce elite control over which community members were involved 
in the monitoring. The second intervention involved distributing hundreds of anonymous 
comment forms throughout the village, in order to allow community members to voice concerns 
or complaints without fear of retaliation.  
The invitations intervention reduced theft of materials, but only for theft of wages (i.e., 
convincing villagers to work for free but billing the project for their work). One reason may be 
that if theft of wages was detected, the benefits would go to the small number of people who 
worked on the project and should have been paid; they, therefore, have a strong personal 
incentive to make prevent this type of corruption. By contrast, the benefits from detecting theft 
of materials would accrue to the village as a whole in the form of a better road, so the free rider 
problem may be more severe. With regard to anonymous comment forms, they were successful 
only when they were distributed via school children, not via the neighborhood government, as 
the neighborhood leaders channeled the forms towards preferred people who were more likely to 
support the elite in the project. One important take-away is that for community participation to 
work, it is important to get the details right in terms of protecting people from retaliation, 
limiting the free rider problem, and preventing elite capture. 
Increasing community participation can influence governance through multiple channels. The 
first, which is emphasized by Olken, is improvements in monitoring. A second possible channel 
is improved information – leaders may learn more about villagers’ preferences and villagers, in 
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turn, may learn more about outcomes. The second channel may be particularly important when 
the outcomes being measured relate to service delivery not corruption.10  
Ferraz and Finan (2008) examine the role of electoral sanctions. Randomized timing of 
municipality audits allows them to examine whether the impact of audit timing on the probability 
that the mayor is re-elected. Conditioning on the number of corruption violations found by the 
auditors, those audited before the election were less likely to be reelected than those who were 
audited after the election. The finding suggests an important complementarity between audits—
which provide information about corruption—and electoral accountability.  
Finally, electoral rules can also create mechanisms and incentives to increase political 
accountability. In a follow-up paper, Ferraz and Finan (2010,a) compare corruption practices for 
mayors audited at the same time but who differ in whether they are serving in a first term 
(eligible for re-election) or a second term (non-eligible for re-election). Using the share of total 
federal resources transferred to municipalities that are associated with fraud in the public 
procurement of goods and services, diversion of funds, and over-invoicing of goods and services 
as a measure of corruption, they find that the share of stolen resources is, on average, 27 percent 
lower among mayors with re-election incentives than among mayors without re-election 
incentives. Although this result suggests a two-term period is more effective than a one-term 
period as an anti-corruption policy, it does not mean politicians should be re-elected indefinitely. 
The absence of term limits by opening up the possibility of long-term entrenchment may 
encourage politicians to develop long-term relationships or policies which benefit them and their 
families.  Term limits could also produce benefits if politicians in the absence of the pressure of 
being re-elected have better incentives to implement socially optimal policies with a long-term 
horizon.  
                                                 
10 Bjorkman and Svensson (2010) examine a community monitoring intervention in Uganda, in which local 
NGOs encouraged communities to be more involved in the state of health service provision. The intervention 
included meetings to discuss baseline information on the status of health service delivery relative to other providers 
and the government standard and encouraged community members to develop a plan identifying key problems and 
steps the providers should take to improve health service provision. The intervention increased the quality and 
quantity of primary health care provision; however, the design of the intervention suggests that the mechanisms 
could have included either or both better information flows and monitoring.  
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(iii) Selection 
Although the simple framework above suggested that the selection of who chooses to 
become a bureaucrat is potentially important, there is relatively little evidence on this point. 
Ferraz and Finan (2010, b) find that higher salaries attract better political candidates in Brazil, 
though the effects are relatively modest—a 20 percent increase in wages only leads to a 0.2 
increase in the average years of schooling and a 0.05 increase in the number of terms of 
experience. Higher wages also improve the performance of a politician while in office. A 20 
percent increase in wages leads to an increase of 25 percent in the number of bills submitted, 
however. They do not, however, examine impacts on corruption per se. Evidence on selection of 
politicians and the impact on corruption forms an important area for future work.  
Selection based on propensity to be corrupt may lead to multiple equilibria in corruption. In 
particular, in a corrupt equilibrium the people who have the highest propensity to take advantage 
of corruption will disproportionately choose to become civil servants, which could make fighting 
corruption in the future more difficult—i.e. the same policies that effectively control corruption 
in a low-corruption country might not be enough to eliminate corruption in a high-corruption 
country, and in fact the same set of incentives might be consistent with both high and low 
corruption equilibria. Testing whether there are multiple equilibria in corruption—for reasons of 
selection or for other reasons—is an important area for future work. 
(iv) Incentives 
The framework outlined above was implicitly a model in which the only way the principal 
can observe what the bureaucrat is doing is through monitoring. For many government activities, 
however, there are direct indicators of  agent behavior. This opens the possibility of tying 
incentives more closely to performance either through direct financial awards or more complex 
incentive schemes through promotions, assignments and the like. However, performance 
indicators can be imperfect measures of the civil servants’ corrupt behavior: we want citations 
issued only for those drivers who actually break the law, and not issued for those who do not; we 
want taxes collected when they are due but we do not want overzealous tax collectors collecting 
from those who do not owe. Hence, in designing such incentive schemes it is critical to deal with 
the so-called “multitasking” problem (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) and ensure that the true 
goals of the principal are achieved, not just the ones that are incentivized. 
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Evidence that directly links performance pay or other incentive schemes with corruption 
outcomes is largely lacking. Much of what we know comes from studies in the health and 
education sector where incentives are conditioned on either worker absenteeism or directly on 
health or education outcomes. The evidence on the effectiveness of incentive schemes that 
condition on worker absenteeism is mixed – in situations where mechanisms to monitor 
performance are relatively tamper-free, performance-based pay can reduce absenteeism and in 
the case of school teachers improve test scores (Duflo et al (2010)). However, if service 
providers can collude with their monitors and/or tamper monitoring tools then such mechanisms 
may be undone in the medium run (Banerjee et al (2008)).  
Similarly, evidence on the effect of performance pay for teachers is mixed. Muralidharan and 
Sundaraman (2009) conduct a randomized evaluation of a teacher incentive program in 
government-run rural primary schools in India. Teachers in treatment schools were eligible to 
receive a bonus payment based on the improvement of the students’ average test scores. Some 
schools were assigned to a group incentive treatment, in which teachers were paid a group bonus 
based on improvements in the school-level average test score, while other schools were assigned 
to an individual incentive treatment in which the teacher was paid an individual bonus based on 
improvement in the average test scores of his/her students.  They find significant improvements 
in student test scores. However, while group and individual incentive schools performed equally 
well in the first year of the program, average test scores were 0.10 standard deviations higher in 
schools where teachers were given individual incentives relative to schools with group incentives 
by the end of second year of program. In contrast, a study by Glewwe et al (2010) in Kenya 
showed that performance pay for teachers led to an improvement in outcomes only along the 
measures that are used to compute the formula that determines pay.  
Outside education and health, there is little evidence on how incentives change the 
performance of bureaucrats. Kahn et al (2001) use tax reform instituted by the Brazilian 
government in 1989 to study the effect of performance-based wages for tax collectors, in an 
economy with widespread tax evasions. The reform offered a bonus to tax officials based on 
group and individual performance in finding and collecting taxes from tax evaders. They find 
that the growth rate of fine collection exhibits a break in 1989, and estimate that fine collections 
per inspection are 75 percent higher on average than what they would have been in the absence 
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of the program, with substantial heterogeneity across regions. The authors do their best to 
provide evidence that the surge in tax collections post-1989 was due to the performance 
incentives provided by the tax reform, but since they do not have a control group, the evidence is 
suggestive but not conclusive.  
Taken together, the tentative conclusion of this evidence is that there is room for incentives 
to succeed, but that caution must be taken to design the incentives well and prevent them from 
being undermined. It is striking that very few studies directly examine the impact of improved 
incentives on corruption outcomes. 
3.1.2. The Market for Bribes: Changing the Structure of the Bureaucracy to Harness the Forces of 
Competition.  
The previous section focused on how a principal—i.e., the government—can best monitor its 
agents—civil servants. In other settings, however, strategic interactions between corrupt agents 
themselves become important and depending on how the market is structured, these kinds of 
strategic interactions can either raise or lower the bribe amounts.  
If a person needs to bribe multiple corrupt officials to perform a given task, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993) argue that that the “double-marginalization” problem can arise. Specifically, if 
each agent does not fully internalize the effect of their bribes on other agents’ bribe revenues, the 
total amount of bribes one would need to pay could be higher than if agents had acted 
independently.  
Olken and Barron (2009) use data on the bribes truck drivers pay to empirically test the idea 
that market forces partially determine the level of corruption and specifically to test for this type 
of double-marginalization. They exploited the fact that, during the period studied, the number of 
checkpoints along one of the roads was reduced in accordance with a peace agreement signed 
earlier in the year. They used this change in market structure to estimate the elasticity of the 
average bribe paid with respect to the expected number of checkpoints. They show that the 
average price paid at checkpoints increases when the number of checkpoints declines, consistent 
with the double-marginalization idea. These findings highlight the need to consider strategic 
interactions between corrupt agents themselves, in addition to interactions between principals 
and agents, in designing effective anti-corruption policy. 
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An implication of this view is that a policy reform that moves from having a large number of 
independent agents to a single agent may reduce corruption and increase economic efficiency. 
Bruhn (2008) uses the sequential implementation of a reform that simplified business entry 
regulations across municipalities in Mexico to estimate the economic effects of such reforms 
more convincingly than in cross-country data. Although the paper does not look at the effects of 
the reform on corruption directly, the results show that simplified regulation improved 
efficiency. She finds that the reform increased the number of registered businesses by 5 percent, 
which was accounted for by former wage earners opening businesses. Wage employment also 
increased by 2.2 percent as a result of the reform, while competition from new entrants decreased 
the income of incumbent businesses by 3 percent. It is, however, not possible to distinguish 
between less potential for corruption and increased convenience as the mechanism underlying 
efficiency gains. 
The flip side of strategic interactions between bureaucrats is that if bureaucrats are competing 
against one another, this could reduce the bribes paid and lead to lower bribes and more output. 
One recent study that examines this is Burgess et al (2011), which explores this issue in the 
context of deforestation in Indonesia. In particular, the study explores a setting in which local 
district forestry officials can allow logging beyond the legal logging quota in exchange for 
bribes. The study shows that as the number of political jurisdictions increases, so that there are 
more bureaucracies with the potential to facilitate illegal logging in a province, logging rates 
increase and prices for wood fall, consistent with a model of Cournot competition between 
bureaucrats.  
Despite the potential for competition between bureaucrats to reduce bribes, other than the 
Burgess et al (2011) study we know of no other evidence that examines how competition 
between bureaucrats works in practice. In the Burgess et al study, competition occurs only 
through the product market—each district chooses how much wood to extract and market 
forces—a common demand curve—determine how much they receive in rents. In many other 
settings, however, individual agents would be able to choose which bureaucrat to work with to 
obtain a service, and the bureaucrats might compete on price. This type of Bertrand competition 
could result in even larger impacts of competition than type of Cournot-style competition studied 
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by Burgess et al (2011). We regard further studies examining competition between agents as a 
first-order question for future work.  
It is important to note that competition leading to lower bribes is not necessarily socially 
optimal. In particular, it depends on what the government is trying to accomplish and whether 
the bribes are on top of, or instead of, official government fees. For example, in the case of 
deforestation studied by Burgess et al (2011), bribes were to allow more logging than the 
government had deemed optimal (for example, for reasons of watershed protection or 
biodiversity protection). Competition meant lower bribes and greater quantities, which in this 
context meant more illegal logging, and hence greater social losses, than had there been less 
competition. On the other hand, in the case of the road checkpoints studied by Olken and Barron 
(2009), traveling the road should have been free, so lower bribes would have meant greater road 
travel and greater efficiency. Understanding the welfare implications of these types of strategic 
interactions depends therefore on whether higher or lower bribes would increase or decrease 
social efficiency, and we do not yet know of an empirical example demonstrating how 
competition between bureaucrats could lead to greater social efficiency. 
3.2. Transparency 
One of the key themes of the international anti-corruption movement is the role of 
transparency—so much so that the largest worldwide anti-corruption NGO is called 
“Transparency International.” But does transparency matter?  
The basic idea about transparency is that by enabling information about government actions, 
citizens can better monitor government officials and enforce greater electoral accountability. 
However, the effect of making information about politicians publicly available is a priori 
unclear. While disclosure of information can increase political accountability it can also 
undermine politicians’ privacy and, thus potentially worsen the pool of entrants.  
Several pieces of evidence suggest a relationship between providing access to information 
about politicians’ performance and both the political accountability and the quality of 
government. In a cross-sectional, cross-country study, Djankov et al (2010) study the 
relationship between disclosure rules for information about parliament members and a numbers 
of measures of quality of government and corruption. Their main conclusion is that public 
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disclosure, but not internal disclosure to parliament, is associated with lower perceived 
corruption and better government. They further find that information about politicians’ assets, 
liabilities, income sources, and potential conflicts, as opposed to simply income and wealth 
levels, are more consistently associated with better government. Since the study is cross-
sectional in nature, they cannot rule out reverse causality (i.e., higher quality governments adopt 
better transparency laws). 
In a more micro example, Banerjee et al (2011) study how public disclosures about 
politicians’ performance and qualifications can influence electoral accountability in settings 
characterized by weak institutions and a less educated population by conducting a randomized 
experiment in Delhi, India. Using the Indian Right to Information Act and candidates’ affidavits, 
they created report cards for ten assembly jurisdictions during the run-up to the 2008 election in 
Delhi. They then randomly provided slum dwellers with pamphlets and free newspapers 
containing information on candidate qualifications and legislator performance.  The information 
increased voter turnout by 3.5 percentages points and reduced the incidence of vote buying by 19 
percentage points. The information campaign seems to increase the quality of government: the 
vote share of the best performing incumbent increased by 7 percentage points in the treatment 
group relative to the controls.  
A related example, which we discussed in the monitoring section (Section 2.1.6) is Ferraz 
and Finan’s (2008) study in Brazil on how public dissemination of corruption scandals in local 
governments had a negative effect on incumbents’ electoral performance. Importantly, they 
found more pronounced impacts in areas where local radio stations were present to broadcast the 
results of the audit reports. The probability of reelection for an incumbent who committed two 
corruption violations in municipalities with pre-election audit was 7 percentage points lower than 
one who had zero violations and 11 percentage points lower if radio stations were present in the 
municipality. One interpretation for the larger effect in municipalities where local radios were 
present to divulge the information is that radios are more efficient in transmitting information 
about local politics to smaller municipalities.  
A second way that transparency may matter—and the way that many suggest it does—is by 
providing citizens with information on what they are entitled to. Reinikka and Svensson (2005) 
study how an information campaign to monitor local officials can reduce corruption and increase 
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educational outputs. They exploit a newspaper campaign in Uganda aimed at reducing capture of 
public funds by providing students’ parents with information to monitor local officials’ use of an 
educational grant. Their empirical strategy used distance to the nearest newspaper outlet as an 
instrument of school exposure to information, and find that an increase in information resulted in 
an increase in spending reaching the schools and ultimately an increase in school enrollment and 
student learning. An important caveat is that distance to newspaper outlets may be non-randomly 
assigned, and may also have other, direct impacts on educational performance.  
A third way in which transparency could matter is by allowing citizens to signal interest in a 
particular outcome. Peisakhin and Pinto (2010) examine this by conducting a randomized 
experiment to test whether freedom-of-information laws can improve access to basic public 
goods that are otherwise attainable only through bribery. The experiment randomly assigned 
individual applicants in India to one of three mechanisms used when requesting public benefits 
and then tested the effect of these mechanisms on the time that elapsed before the applicant 
received the benefit. In the first treatment group, applicants submitted an information request 
under the Right to Information Act shortly after their applications. The second group of 
applicants presented a letter of support from a local NGO with their application. Finally, the third 
group of applicants paid a bribe to a local to obtain the benefits. According to the results 94 
percent of those who pay bribes or sent an information request received benefits over the course 
of one year, as opposed to 21 percent in the NGO and control groups. Individuals in the group 
that paid bribes received benefits in a median of 82 days, 38 days less than those in the groups 
that filed an information request. The groups that neither paid a bribe nor requested information 
only obtained benefits after 343 days. The results suggest that requesting information under the 
freedom of information law is a reasonable, though imperfect, substitute for bribing an official. 
In a follow-up study, Peisakhin (2011) estimates the effect of the freedom-of-information law in 
the process of voter registration and here they find that the information law is an effective, free 
and legal substitute to bribery for middle class applicants.  
3.3. Technology and Communications 
Technological innovations can help make available tools that are hard for humans to tamper 
with and to enhance communication. For many (though not all) corrupt activities, the corrupt 
agent needs to somehow evade the rules or procedures that the official government bureaucracy 
34 
 
has set up. Technology can help address this problem by ensuring mechanically that certain 
procedures are followed (Duflo et al (2010)).  
Technology can also have a substantial impact on corruption by facilitating communication, 
which can enable better monitoring. Yang (2008) explores how hiring foreign inspectors to 
verify the tariff classification and the value of shipments before they leave their origin country 
impacts import duty collections. The key mechanism to reduce customs fraud is the transmission 
of information from the foreign firm at the origin port to the client government. The flow of 
information could not only improve the monitoring ability but also reduce the bargaining power 
of corrupt customs officials, which can reduce bribes payments and custom clearance time. The 
results from the study provide evidence in favor of this hypothesis showing pre-shipment imports 
inspection programs increased import duty collection by 15 to 30 percentage points in the first 
five years after implementation. 
Related to this, in many countries technology has played an important role in the design and 
administration of the tax system. One key idea of tax enforcement is double-reporting, where the 
tax department compares two independent reports about tax performance and investigates 
discrepancies. In the developed world, Kleven et al (2010) analyzes a randomized tax 
enforcement experiment in Denmark and find that that the tax evasion rate is very small (0.3 
percent) for income subject to double-reporting and much higher (37 percent) for self-reported 
income. Relatedly, in Chile, Pomeranz (2010) finds that audits have a much larger impact on the 
part of the VAT chain where there is not double-reporting, suggesting that for the rest of the 
VAT chain double reporting played an important role in encouraging truth telling. Technology 
plays a key role here: in a manual system actually doing the matching from all the double-
reported information would be very challenging, but once the system is automated it is much 
easier. Given the large number of countries in the process of modernizing and computerizing 
their tax infrastructure, it should be possible to study the impacts of this type of technology in the 
context of poorer countries where tax evasion is usually higher. 
A final area where technology holds promise is in procurement. Throughout the world, 
including in the developing world, governments have been moving to online procurement 
systems. Online procurement systems can potentially reduce corruption by increasing access to 
information (undermining bidding rings) and by making the procurement system more 
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transparent. Lewis-Faupel et al (2011) examine the impact of electronic procurement for road 
projects in India, taking advantage of a staggered rollout across Indian states. They find that 
electronic procurement leads to higher quality of roads, as measured by independent central 
government audits, though not to lower costs. The evidence suggests that the quality 
improvement comes from higher quality contractors being more likely to win contracts. 
4. Some Caveats: Adaptation in the Short and Medium Run 
Much of the evidence discussed above shows the short-run effects of anti-corruption policies 
and programs. But there is ample evidence to believe that the long-run impacts could be quite 
different. For example, it could take corrupt officials time to learn how to manipulate a new 
system, so the long-run effects of an anti-corruption policy could be smaller than the short-run 
effects. Alternatively, it could take time for a new group of civil servants to select into the 
system, so an anti-corruption policy could be more effective over time if it encourages more low-
corruption types to select into the civil service. Or, officials might simply substitute from one 
form of corruption to another. 
In the short-run, we have seen several examples of substitution from one type of corruption 
to another. In the Olken (2007) study, an increase in auditing of road expenditures led to 
decreased missing expenditures from the project, but more family members of project officials 
being hired to build the roads. In Niehaus and Sukhtantar (2010), conversely, an increase the 
wages of daily wage jobs (and hence in the ability to steal from those workers) led to a reduction 
in theft of piece-rate jobs. Burgess et al (2011) find that when a district’s oil and gas revenue 
increases, providing an alternate source of rent extraction for local district officials, illegal 
logging falls.  In all these cases, it appears that corrupt officials have different avenues of 
corruption available to them, and substitute among them as the returns to one form of corruption 
get easier or harder. If an anti-corruption policy clamps down differentially on certain types of 
corruption (as almost all do), one needs to take care that corrupt officials do not substitute to 
other forms of corruption with more severe efficiency costs. 
There are also several examples that suggest that the long-run effect of anti-corruption 
policies may be smaller than the short-run effect as officials adapt. One of the examples 
mentioned above is Banerjee et al (2008). In this study, an incentive program on nurse 
attendance in India was found effective only during the first 6 months of the intervention, when 
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the program was correctly in place. Later, however, the system was undermined by the local 
health administration, who took advantage of a loophole in the program design and began 
allowing many more unexcused absences.  By 18 months after the program had started, the 
program was no longer able to improve nurse attendance.  
In the case of Brazil, Ramalho (2007) uses the 1992 impeachment of President Fernando 
Collor to evaluate the impact and persistence of corruption on the market value of politically 
connected companies. The results suggest that the market perceived the decrease in the 
president’s probability of staying in power as affecting the value of politically connected 
companies, but only temporarily. According to the results, family-connected companies had on 
average daily abnormal returns 2 to 9 percentage points lower during bad event days, with the 
effect reversing completely within one year. One interpretation is that over the course of the 
year, these previously politically connected firms were able to form new connections. 
In Colombia, Camacho and Conover (2009) study the manipulation of the poverty index 
score as an eligibility requirement to gain access to social programs. In particular, people were 
eligible for the program if their poverty index was below a given threshold. In the first year of 
the program, there was no discontinuity in poverty index scores at the threshold, but over the 
subsequent years, as the formula became better known, more and more manipulation began to 
take place, resulting in a larger number of people with scores just below the eligibility threshold. 
The results suggest that in total three million people had their score changed, which accounts for 
about 40 percent of the beneficiaries.  
A final example comes from Burgess et al (2011). As noted above, when a district’s oil and 
gas revenue increases, providing an alternate source of rent extraction for local district officials, 
illegal logging falls. However, within 3 years, the effect reverses and illegal logging returns to 
almost its previous level. Burgess et al provide suggestive evidence that the mechanism is a 
change in the political equilibrium—the higher oil and gas rents change the nature of the 
governing coalition towards a type of coalition associated with higher rent extraction. This new 
political coalition presumably extracts rents not just from oil and gas but also from the forest 
sector. 
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5. Concluding thoughts 
Recent years have seen a dramatic rise in micro-empirical research on corruption in 
developing countries. A string of papers have shown how basic economic concepts can be 
applied to corruption. Corrupt officials respond to incentives and the threat of punishment, even 
in corrupt environments. Strategic interactions between corrupt officials affect the level of 
corruption – bidding down bribes if they compete against one another, and increasing bribes if 
multiple bribes are required and officials can’t coordinate with one another. Recent work has 
also shown that corrupt officials are resilient: over time, they adapt to changes in their 
environments, in some cases offsetting anti-corruption policies with new avenues for seeking out 
rents. 
While these examples have highlighted cases where adaptation took place over time, it is also 
possible that in some situations the long-term impacts of anti-corruption policies exceed the 
short-run effects. One area where this is likely is the case of transparency reforms– a higher 
likelihood of information disclosures may both incentivize politicians to perform better and 
improve the incentives for high talent individuals to enter politics.  
It is also important to note that there is relatively little research on many of the main anti-
corruption policy initiatives we observe in the world today. When aiming to fight corruption 
domestically, many countries set up high-profile, independent anti-corruption agencies with 
prosecutorial powers. From the international perspective, there have been major efforts at 
promoting transparency (such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative), and at 
limiting the ability of foreign companies to pay bribes (such as the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention and the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act). Despite the recent advances in research 
on corruption, we know relatively little about whether these types of domestic and international 
policy initiatives are successful, and how potentially corrupt agents respond to these types of 
policies. 
Taken together, the existing and ongoing research on corruption in developing countries 
suggests a large and promising research agenda. Researchers have identified several innovative 
ways of measuring corruption and economic theory offers us significant guidance on how to 
design anti-corruption policies. At the same time, the ability of individuals to outguess those who 
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seek to regulate them suggests an important need to collect data on both the short- and long-run 
impacts of many different anti-corruption policies in many different contexts.   
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Table 1: Magnitudes of Corruption 
Paper Country Context Strategy for 
Assessing 
Corruption 
Corruption 
estimate 
Corruption 
Estimate (in 
percent) 
Estimates of bribery   
Svensson (2003) Uganda Bribes firms 
pay  
Survey evidence Firms pay bribes 
of US$88 per 
worker  
8% of costs 
Olken and Barron (2009) Indonesia Bribes truck 
drivers pay to 
police on their 
routes   
Direct observation:  
Enumerators 
accompanied truck 
drivers on their 
regular routes, 
dressed as truck 
drivers’ assistants 
and observed illegal 
payments 
Truck drivers pay 
bribes averaging 
US$0.50 to US$1 
per payment 
13% of cost 
of a trip 
McMillan and Zoido (2004) Peru Bribes the 
secret police 
paid to judges, 
politicians, and 
media to 
support the 
Fujimori 
Direct observation: 
After fall of Fujimori 
regime, videotapes 
and bribe receipts 
became public 
Politicians 
received bribes of 
$3,000 - $50,000 
per month. Media 
received bribes as 
much as $1.5 
million per month 
N/A 
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regime for one television 
station’s support.  
Sequeira, Djankov (2010) South Africa Bribe payments 
to port and 
border post 
officials  
Direct observation: 
Enumerators 
shadowed clearing 
agents in ports to 
collect information 
on bribe payments 
Bribes amounted 
to 14% and 4% 
respectively of the 
total shipping 
costs for container 
passing through 
Mozambique and 
South Africa. 
14% of 
shipping 
costs (Moz.) 
Mozambique 4% of 
shipping 
costs (S. 
Africa) 
Estimates of graft   
Reinikka and Svensson 
(2004)  
Uganda  Graft in public 
spending of 
educational 
funds intended 
to cover 
school’s 
nonwage 
payments  
Estimate by 
subtraction: PETS 
compared the 
amount of grant sent 
down from the 
central government 
to the amount 
received by schools. 
Schools received 
on average only 13 
percent of the 
grants  
87% of funds 
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Olken (2007) Indonesia Graft in the 
building of 
rural roads 
funded through 
a national 
government 
program  
Estimate by 
subtraction:  
Compared the 
official amount spent 
on the road to an 
independent 
engineering estimate 
of what the road 
actually cost to build.
“Missing 
expenditures” – 
the difference 
between what the 
village claimed the 
road cost and what 
the engineers 
estimated it 
actually cost – 
averaged about 
24% of the total 
cost of the road. 
24% of cost 
of the road 
Olken (2006) Indonesia Theft of rice 
from a program 
that distributed 
subsidized rice  
Estimate by 
subtraction:  
compare 
administrative data 
to a generally 
administered 
household survey. 
At least 18% of 
the program’s rice 
disappeared before 
reaching 
households. 
18% of 
program 
expenditures 
Hsieh and Moretti(2006) Iraq Bribes from the 
under-pricing 
of oil in Iraq’s 
Oil For Food 
Estimates by 
subtraction: gap  
between the selling 
price of Iraqi oil to 
the Oil for Food 
Iraq collected $1.3 
billion in bribes 
from under-pricing 
oil, or 2 percent of 
2% of oil 
revenues 
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Program Program and the 
author’s estimates of 
the “market” price of 
Iraqi oil  
oil revenues. 
Khwaja and Mian (2005) Pakistan Politically 
connected loans
Estimate from 
market inference: 
Additional non-
performance rate 
from politically 
connected loans 
compared to non-
politically connected 
loans 
Politically 
connected firms 
receive 45 percent 
larger loans from 
government banks 
in spite of having 
a 50 percent 
higher default 
rates. 
0.3 - 1.9 
percent of 
GDP 
Niehaus and Sukhtankar 
(2010) 
India Wages on the 
National Rural 
Employee 
Guarantee 
Scheme 
Estimate by 
subtraction: 
Compare officially 
paid wages to wages 
as reported by a 
survey 
Rs. 236 stolen per 
actual day paid, 
where an actual 
day paid is approx. 
Rs. 60 
79% of labor 
expenditures 
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Fisman (2001) Indonesia Value of 
political 
connections to 
President 
Suharto to 
Indonesian 
public firms 
Estimate from 
market inference:  
Firm stock price 
movement when 
Soeharto fell ill 
given the strength of 
its political 
connections to 
Suharto 
23% of the value 
of the most 
connected firms 
was due to 
political 
connections 
23% of value 
of firm 
Fisman et al (2006)  US Value of 
personal ties to  
Vice-president 
Cheney of U.S 
public firms  
Estimate from 
market inference: 
Firms’ stock price 
movement in 
response to shock to 
Cheney’s health 
given the strength of 
connection to 
Cheney 
In all events 
studied there is a 
zero effect on the 
stock prices of 
connected firms.  
0% of value 
of firm 
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Faccio (2006) Cross-country Value of 
political 
connections for 
firms across 
sample of 47 
countries  
Estimate from 
market inference: 
Stock price 
movements of firms 
around the time of 
announcements that 
officers or large 
shareholders are 
entering politics or 
that politicians are 
joining their boards.  
2.29% increase in 
company value 
when a 
businessman 
enters politics. 
4.32% increase in 
stock market value 
when a board 
member or large 
shareholder 
becomes a 
politician in 
countries where 
corruption is 
above median.  
2.3% - 4.3% 
of company 
value 
Gorodnichenko and Peter 
(2007) 
Ukraine Bribes received 
by public sector 
employees  
Estimate from 
market inference:  
residual wage 
differentials between 
the public and 
private sectors 
(consumption levels 
are the same in the 
two groups and labor 
Aggregate amount 
of bribery 
estimated to be is 
between US$460 
million – US$580 
million, or about 
1% of GDP of 
Ukraine.  
1% of GDP 
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market equilibrium 
implies employees 
are indifferent 
between working in 
the public and 
private sectors. 
Finan and  Ferraz (2010) Brazil Corruption in 
municipal 
government 
Audit reports from 
central government 
auditors 
Audits find 
average of 
R$327,000 
diverted resources 
per violation, or 
8% of total 
amount audited 
8% of total 
amount 
audited 
Besley et al  (2011) India Beneficiary 
selection by 
village council 
Conditional on 
eligibility, does 
political office 
predict beneficiary 
status 
Chief village 
councilor is 10% 
more likely to be a 
beneficiary 
2% of 
beneficiaries 
selected 
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